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Abstract
Recent empirical findings suggest that societies have become more polarized in various countries.
That is, the median voter of today represents a smaller fraction of society compared to two decades
ago and yet, the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are not fully understood. Since inter-
actions between influential actors (“activists”) and voters play a major role in opinion formation,
e.g. through social media, we develop a macroscopic opinion model in which competing activists
spread their political ideas in specific groups of society. These ideas spread further to other groups
in declining strength. While unilateral spreading shifts the opinion distribution, competition of ac-
tivists leads to additional phenomena: Small heterogeneities among competing activists cause them
to target different groups in society, which amplifies polarization. For moderate heterogeneities, we
obtain target cycles and further amplification of polarization. In such cycles, the stronger activist
differentiates himself from the weaker one, while the latter aims to imitate the stronger activist.
∗ lucasb@ethz.ch
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a well-documented increase of political polarization in the US and, to a lower
extent, in Europe. In the US, both the electorate and the political parties have become
increasingly polarized (see e.g. Refs. [1–5]). Recent findings suggest that these developments
can be traced back to a growing divide between political and cultural groups, and a lower
heterogeneity within groups [1, 6]. That is, we observe a simultaneous increase of polarization
of parties and the electorate, and an increase in party identification and attachment to views
on certain political issues. Loosely speaking, in the past few years, it has become less likely
to meet liberal republicans or conservative democrats [1, 5]. Many explanations for these
observations have been put forward. Examples include the growing influence of media [3, 7],
macroeconomic developments such as growing income inequality and changes in international
trade, elite polarization [8], or demographic changes.
This raises the issue whether polarization is due to exogenous factors, or whether it is an
endogenous phenomenon resulting from forces within the opinion formation process occur-
ring in politically and economically stable environments. Simple explanations such as the
growing use of the Internet appear insufficient to describe the observed polarization behav-
ior. A recent analysis of the influence of the Internet on political polarization of US adults
revealed that the growth in polarization is greatest in demographic groups with the lowest
Internet and social media use [2]. Hence, several processes may contribute to political polar-
ization. Mathematical models can provide important insights into the dynamics of opinion
formation, polarization dynamics, and related spreading processes [9–19]. In particular,
agent-based and network approaches helped to identify mechanisms underlying consensus,
polarization, and fragmentation dynamics [20–26].
We propose an analytically accessible model of political change that is based on three
processes: (i) emergence of political (or cultural) innovations or ideas, (ii) dynamic diffusion
of innovations across the electorate, and (iii) injection of ideas by competing influential
social actors at appropriate places in society. Usually, influential actors can be individuals or
groups of individuals with a particular political or cultural interest. Often, leaders of interest
groups or political parties are the influential actors. Henceforth, we simply refer to such
influential actors as “activists”. Today, activists have enhanced means to spread their ideas
in particular subgroups of society. Facebook and Twitter are prominent examples of social
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Figure 1. Polarization model. In this example, the political spectrum consists of N = 9 different
states and is divided in three groups: group A, a neutral set of agents, and group B. A transition
from one state to its nearest neighbors occurs with probability p. A political activist A+ or B+
can locally decrease transition probabilities (p− < p) or increase them (p+ > p).
media channels that allow activists to spread their ideas in their follower groups. Recent
developments in data-driven campaigning and microtargeting [27–31] provide activists with
opportunities to localize and target certain voter groups by linking different data sets. For
example, in the campaigns of Ted Cruz, Donald J. Trump, and the pro-Brexit Vote Leave
movement, Facebook-user-data was used by Cambridge Analytica [32] and AggregateIQ [33]
to microtarget entire voter groups.
With our model, we aim at examining how a society may become polarized, or more po-
larized, when activists try to impact the opinions of citizens with new political ideas in order
to maximize their share of supporting individuals. We consider a society in which opinion
formation without political innovations and activists tends to lead to non-polarized politics
in the sense that opinions of citizens are uniformly distributed across the opinion spectrum,
or centered around the median. This allows us to isolate the role of competing activists that
inject political ideas at certain locations in the political opinion spectrum. Our approach
complements existing studies [10, 11, 34, 35] by considering the dynamical interactions of
voters and activists. We demonstrate that polarization emerges in the presence of competing
activists, their mutual positioning in society, and the dynamic diffusion of ideas in society.
II. THE MODEL
To study the influence of competing activists on opinion formation and polarization in a
society, we proceed in two steps to account for processes (i–iii). In the first step, we consider
a one-dimensional chain which consists of N different states {Xi}i∈{1,...,N}, as shown in
Fig. 1 without considering activists. The choice of discrete opinion states Xi is motivated
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Figure 2. The influence of initial distributions. The left panel shows a polarized initial voter
distribution. We observe an equilibration towards a unique uniform distribution, as illustrated in
the right panel. In the right panel, numerical and analytical results (Eq. (6)) are represented by
grey dots and a black solid line, respectively. The data has been averaged over 103 samples for
p = 0.2 and T = 2× 106 and 105 initial equilibration steps.
by the possibility of activists to directly influence large subgroups of the society, with the
transmission of a certain idea. The discretization matches the size of these subgroups. Also,
the empirical opinion distributions in the US public and congress that are based on survey
data [1, 5, 36] and corresponding scaling methods (e.g., the NOMINATE method [37, 38])
are assembled in discrete form. The state Xi(t) represents the fraction of individuals of type
i at time t which are normalized according to
N∑
i=1
Xi(t) = 1. (1)
The transition probability from state i to state j is represented by pij. In Fig. 1, we only
considered transitions to nearest neighbors. The elements pij form the transition matrix
P and satisfy
∑N
j=1 pij = 1. While we employ a macroscopic model with a set of opinion
classes in this work, there are convenient ways to microfound the aggregate opinion formation
process at the individual level. Two ways for such microfoundations are conceivable. First,
the model of DeGroot [39] allows to interpret transitions from one state to another as a
social learning process in a group of communicating individuals. Second, the macroscopic
distributions of opinions can be recovered in random matching models in which individuals
have the highest chance to meet other individuals of similar opinion. After every meeting,
individuals update their opinion and may switch to the opinion of their partner with some
probability. Equivalently, individuals change their opinion if they meet a sufficient number
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of people with alternative opinions (see e.g. Refs. [16, 17, 20]). We consider the situation
where N = 9 and partition the states in three opinion groups: group A, a set of neutral
agents, and group B. Our specific choice of the number of states is not affecting the results
in Secs. III and IV. We discuss the case of an even number of states in Appendix B. An
individual located at the beginning of the chain (i = 1) can be interpreted as a very liberal
democrat, whereas the end of the chain (i = N) corresponds to a strongly conservative
republican.
To interpret polarization according to empirical survey data of Ref. [5], it is important to
stress again that extreme positions in the opinion chain correspond to large correlations be-
tween party identification and views on certain political issues [1]. We model the emergence
of political (or cultural) innovations or ideas (process (i)) by considering a certain initial
distribution of Xi(t = 0) = X
0
i . To describe the dynamic diffusion of innovations across the
electorate (process (ii)), we now focus on the dynamics of the model. We simulate the time
evolution of Xi(t) for T transitions, i.e., t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. In each round, we select a state
i uniformly at random from the set {1, . . . , N}. The corresponding update dynamics for all
states j ∈ {1, . . . , N} is
Xj(t)→ Xj(t) + pijXi(t). (2)
In the case of j = i, the transition probability can be also expressed as pii = 1 −
∑
i 6=j pij.
An analytical solution of Eq. (2) is presented in the following section.
In the second step, we introduce two competing activists A+ and B+, who aim at inject-
ing ideas at some appropriate place in society (process (iii)). After activists have targeted a
certain place, e.g. their follower groups on Facebook or Twitter or groups they have identi-
fied through microtargeting as being potentially open to their ideas, the opinion formation
process as described in Eq. (2) applies. The goal of activists is to maximize the support of
the groups on the left or right side of the political spectrum. Their ideas represent issues that
are particularly attractive to the left or right side. Typical examples of such issues include
Obamacare, an extension or abolishment of abortion rights, and commitments to never rise
taxes, or the opposite. Activists have to choose a location i in society where to inject their
ideas. An activist A+ (B+) locally increases (decreases) pii−1 and decreases (increases) pii+1
by an amount of A (B). Until Sec. IV, we consider the case where  = A = B.
As an example, in Fig. 1, activist A+ is located at state i = 3 and B+ at state i = 6.
5
Figure 3. The influence of activists. In the left panel, activists A+ and B+ are located
at positions 3 and 7, whereas in the right panel, they are located at positions 3, 8 and 2, 7. In
both scenarios, a polarized equilibrium distribution is observed. Numerical and analytical results
(Eq. (6)) are represented by grey markers and a black solid line, respectively. The data has been
averaged over 103 samples for p = 0.2, T = 2× 106 and 105 initial equilibration steps.
Mathematically, we assume that this leads to a larger transition probability p32 = p
+ = p+,
whereas the transition probability p34 = p
− = p −  is reduced. The parameter  is taken
from the interval  ∈ (0,min{p, 1−p}). We will explore two main variants how such activists
compete for support. First, we explore the consequences when one or several activists have
a fixed place in the political spectrum. Second, we consider the impact on polarization
when two activists with possibly different strengths of ideas, and thus possibilities to affect
transition probabilities, choose the best possible locations in the political spectrum. The
strategic choice of locations defines a game, and we determine the mutual best responses.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF ACTIVISTS ON OPINION DISTRIBUTIONS
We first establish a mathematical framework for the update dynamics of state i. We
consider a tridiagonal transition matrix that describes nearest neighbor interactions with
pii+1 = pi, pii−1 = qi, and pii = 1 − pi − qi. The update rule of state Xi(t) with i /∈ {1, N}
reads
Xi(t+ 1) = (1− pi − qi)Xi(t) + qi+1Xi+1(t) + pi−1Xi−1(t). (3)
We are not considering periodic boundaries, and thus find for state i = 1 that
X1(t+ 1) = (1− p1)X1(t) + q2X2(t). (4)
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A stationary state implies Xi(t + 1) = Xi(t) ≡ Xi and Eq. (4) yields X2 = (p1/q2)X1.
Furthermore, based on Eq. (3), we obtain
Xi+1 =
pi + qi
qi+1
Xi − pi−1
qi+1
Xi−1. (5)
The solution of Eq. (5) is given by
Xi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pj
qj+1
)
X1 with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (6)
We proof this claim by induction and note that Eq. (5) is fulfilled for i = 1. For the induction
step, we obtain
Xi+1 =
pi + qi
qi+1
Xi − pi−1
qi+1
Xi−1
=
pi + qi
qi+1
(
p1
q2
· p2
q3
· · · pi−2
qi−1
· pi−1
qi
)
X1
− pi−1
qi+1
(
p1
q2
· p2
q3
· · · pi−2
qi−1
)
X1
=
(
p1
q2
· p2
q3
· · · pi−1
qi
· pi
qi+1
)
X1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pj
qj+1
)
X1.
(7)
This proves the claim. To fulfill the normalization condition of Eq. (1), we set X1 = 1
and then divide each state Xi by
∑N
i=1Xi. The stationary distribution X = (X1, . . . , XN)
is unique because the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic [40]. Irreducibility
follows from the fact that any state in the Markov chain can be reached from any other
state, and aperiodicity is satisfied because of P nii > 0 for all n ∈ N [40]. A different solution
approach for equal transition probabilities is presented in Refs. [41, 42]. For the example in
Fig. 1, with pi = qi = p but without activists, the solution is X = N
−1(1, 1, . . . , 1)T . We
illustrate the equilibration towards the unique uniform distribution for an initially polarized
distribution in Fig. 2. The simulation results of Eq. (2) agree well with the analytical solution
given by Eq. (6). What happens when there is one activist located at a certain position in
the opinion chain? As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an A+ activist at position i = 3 and set
q3 = p+ , p3 = p− . All remaining transition probabilities are unaffected and equal to p.
The resulting unnormalized solution is X = (1, 1, p/(p+ ), (p− )/(p+ ), . . . )T . If  equals
p, an absorbing state emerges and the resulting equilibrium distribution depends on the
initial distribution (matrix P is no longer irreducible). It is also possible to consider two or
more activists which change the transition probabilities locally. We illustrate the stationary
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Figure 4. Relative opinion shares for different activist positions. We compute the
stationary opinion fractions according to Eq. (6) for activists at different locations, which lead to
locally larger (p+  = p+ 0.1) or smaller (p−  = p− 0.1) transition probabilities (p = 0.2). In the
left panel, red indicates a large fraction of individuals in favor of group A relative to group B, and
blue indicates the opposite behavior. All states left (right) from the center are counted as belonging
to group A (group B). In the right panel, we show the best responses as defined by Eqs. (8) and
(9). The intersection defines the corresponding Nash equilibrium. The grey solid line indicates the
convergence towards the Nash equilibrium for initial activist locations (jA, jB) = (1, 3).
distributions for different numbers of activists and values of  in Fig. 3. Depending on the
number of activists and their positions, different stationary distributions are possible. For
example, in the upper panel of Fig. 3, an A+ activist targets the boundary region between
group A and the neutral voters, and a second B+ activist targets the boundary between the
neutral region and group B. In this way, the center is thinned out and we obtain a polarized
stationary opinion distribution.
IV. COMPETITION OF TWO ACTIVISTS WITH ENDOGENOUS LOCATION
CHOICES
We now turn to our main analysis and consider the case, when an activist can change their
position in society in response to the activity of a second activist. We perform this exercise in
an initially unpolarized society (i.e., a uniform opinion distribution). This may represent the
situation in the US some decades ago, when the society was much less polarized. However,
apart from this empirical rationale, there are also two conceptual arguments why starting
with an unpolarized society is useful. First, the enhanced means of targeting subgroups
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Figure 5. Best responses for different activist positions and different persuasion
probabilities. Based on Eq. (6), the stationary solution is computed for activists at different
locations, which lead to locally larger (q + A, p + B) or smaller (p − A, q − B) transition
probabilities (p = 0.2). From the upper left to the lower right panel, we assumed different values
of A ∈ {0.11, 0.13, 0.15, 0.17} and set B = 0.1. All states left (right) from the center are counted
as belonging to group A (group B). The grey solid line indicates the convergence towards a
Nash equilibrium (upper left panel) or a cycle (remaining panels) for initial activist locations
(jA, jB) = (1, 3).
developed in recent times also allow activists to switch easily from one group to other
groups over time. Hence, we identify how such enhanced targeting possibilities impact
polarization. Second, by considering initially polarized societies in Appendix A, we can
identify the influence of activists when polarizing activities have already been present in
the past. We interpret competition of activists as an optimization game in which they try
to find the optimal position in order to maximize the shares of individuals following their
opinion. Specifically, let jA and jB represent the locations of activists A
+ and B+, and let
Xi(jA, jB) be the size of the resulting equilibrated opinion group i ∈ {1, . . . , 9}. For a given
jB ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, we want to obtain the best responses j∗A of activist A+. Therefore, we
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Figure 6. Dynamic equilibria and threshold behavior. Based on Eq. (6), the stationary
solution is computed for activists at different locations which, lead to locally larger (q+ A, p+ B)
or smaller (p− A, q− B) transition probabilities (p = 0.2). In the upper panels, we set A = 0.15
and B = 0.1. The stationary opinion distributions of one cycle are shown in the upper left panel.
In the upper right panel, we illustrate the corresponding time evolution of the opinion fraction in
the neutral region. The lower left panel shows the opinion distributions for the best response of
A+ given jB = 5 and different values of A and B = 0.1. In the lower right panel, we show the
center loss, i.e., the difference between the fractions at the center for 0.1 ≤ A ≤ 0.2 and B = 0.1.
consider the case where the goal of activist A+ is to obtain the greatest possible fraction of
voters in the left half of the opinion chain. The resulting optimal position of A+ is
j∗A = argmax
jA
{
4∑
i=1
Xi(jA, jB)
}
. (8)
Similarly, we obtain the best responses j∗B of an activist B
+ for a given jA ∈ {1, . . . , 9}
according to
j∗B = argmax
jB
{
9∑
i=6
Xi(jA, jB)
}
. (9)
As an example, we analyze the situation where both activists have an equally strong influence
 = 0.1 on the transition probabilities p = 0.2. We illustrate the fraction of individuals in
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favor of opinion group A for different locations of A+ and B+ in the upper panel of Fig. 4.
To illustrate the emergence of the Nash equilibrium, we consider the case where B+ is
initially located at state 3. The best response of A+ is to target opinion state 5. Also
activist B+ is then located at position 5 as a best response. We show the corresponding
trajectory (grey solid line) in Fig. 4. Indeed, in the case of an equally strong influence of both
activists, the best response of both activists is to always occupy the center. This behavior
is also illustrated in the lower panel of Fig. 4. The Nash equilibrium (j∗A, j
∗
B) = (5, 5) is
defined by the intersection of both best response curves j∗A(jB) and j
∗
B(jA). This equilibrium
corresponds to the situation where the effects of both activists cancel out if their influence
is equally strong.
Interestingly, the situation is more complex if activists differ in their strengths (A 6=
B). To analyze the corresponding equilibria, we consider the case where A > B = 0.1
without loss of generality. In Fig. 5 we show the best responses for different values of
A ∈ {0.11, 0.13, 0.15, 0.17}. If A is larger than a certain critical value cA, three important
observations can be made: (a) The best response curves have no intersection point anymore
and consequently, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) If A+ is located at
the center or somewhere left from the center, the best response of B+ is to occupy the same
position as A approaches p. (c) The stronger activist avoids to target the same position as
the weaker one. We illustrate these observations by an example. We consider the path of
best responses illustrated by the grey solid line in the upper right panel of Fig. 5 (A = 0.13)
and initially locate B+ at position jB = 3. The best response of A
+ is j∗A(jB = 3) = 5.
Then, B+ chooses j∗B(jA = 5) = 5 as best response. Given jB = 5, activist A
+ avoids its
opponent and targets voters at position j∗A(jB = 5) = 4. Now, the best response of B
+ is to
match the location of A+ by selecting j∗B(jA = 4) = 4. The cycle of best responses between 4
and 5 would go on forever. This also illustrates that no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
exists. We thus employ a dynamic version of the location game and allow in each period
that one activist chooses his location as a best response in terms of the location choice of
its opponent. There is an additional motivation for this modeling choice. Activists need
time to organize access to the subgroups they want to target. Hence, changing locations
needs time, and in our model, it takes one period. Furthermore, we consider the activists to
alternate with their location choices. The alternative would be to consider mixed strategy
equilibria, which, on average, yields qualitatively the same results.
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Figure 7. Relative opinion-shares for certain best response activist positions. The
relative opinion-shares rAB(jA, jB) (A relative to B), rNA(jA, jB) (N relative to A) and rNB(jA, jB)
(N relative to B) as a function of (A − B) /p, with B = 0.1 and p = 0.2. The activists are
either both located at the center ((jA, jB) = (5, 5)) or activist A
+ avoids B+ as a best response
((jA, jB) = (4, 5)). In the case of (jA, jB) = (4, 5), the neutral regions are thinned out relative to
group A, whereas the fraction stays constant relative to group B. The phase diagram of the two
activist model with transition probabilities p = 0.2 is shown in the lower right panel.
The resulting stationary distributions for the described cycle are shown in the upper left
panel of Fig. 6. We see that the concentration of voters in the neutral region varies between
large and small fractions. We interpret this behavior as a temporal variation between more
and less polarized opinion distributions. The corresponding time evolution of the fraction
of voters in the neutral region is shown in the upper right panel of Fig. 6. We observe
oscillations with a cycle period of four. The data presented in Fig. 6 suggests that the
equilibrium where (jA, jB) = (4, 5) leads to a situation where the center is thinned out if
A > 
c
A. Such a behavior is a potential amplification mechanism of polarization. To analyze
this effect further, in the lower left panel of Fig. 6, we illustrate the stationary opinion
distributions, considering the best response of A+, given jB = 5, for different values of A. If
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the difference between A and B is small enough, the neutral region is almost unaffected due
to fact that the best response of A+ is j∗A(jB = 5) = 5. In particular, the opinion fraction at
the center is invariant under the influence of a growing A as long as A < 
c
A. The reason
for this effect is that in this case, the fraction at the center is
X5(jA = 5, jB = 5) =
p
p+
9p
p+
=
1
9
. (10)
However, as soon as A exceeds 
c
A, the neutral region is suddenly thinned out and we observe
a clear polarization effect. The reason is that the best response of A+ is to now target position
j∗A(jB = 5) = 4 as best response. The difference between the opinion fraction at the central
state for A = 0 and A > 0 (center loss) is shown in the lower right panel of Fig. 6. It
is noteworthy that this transition only emerges due to the best response dynamics of two
competing activists. Such abrupt transitions are difficult to predict and control because
slight variations in the control parameter cause significant macroscopic differences.
To understand the observed threshold effect, we have to analyze the competitive ad-
vantage accompanying the evasion behavior of the stronger activist. We use Eq. (3) and
determine the unnormalized equilibrium distribution X = (X1, . . . , X9). We first analyze
the situation in which both activists are located at the center. The resulting unnormalized
distribution is X = (1, 1, 1, 1, p/(p + ∆), (p − ∆)/(p + ∆), . . . , (p − ∆)/(p + ∆)), with
∆ = A − B. In this case, the relative vote-share rAB(jA, jB) of group A relative to group
B is given by
rAB(5, 5) =
∑4
i=1Xi(5, 5)∑9
i=6Xi(5, 5)
=
p+ ∆
p−∆. (11)
If activist A+ is, however, located at the center and activist B+ is located one position
further to the left, we obtain
rAB(4, 5) =
∑4
i=1Xi(4, 5)∑9
i=6Xi(4, 5)
=
(4p+ 3A)(p− B)
4(p− A)(p+ B) . (12)
These two relative opinion-shares are shown in the upper left panel of Fig. 7. The intersection
point determines the threshold
cA =
p2 + 7B
2
p+ 7B
. (13)
Furthermore, in Fig. 7, we also show the remaining relative opinion shares
rNA(jA, jB) =
X5(4, 5)∑4
i=1Xi(4, 5)
(14)
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and
rNB(jA, jB) =
X5(4, 5)∑9
i=6Xi(4, 5)
. (15)
In the case of p = 0.2 and B = 0.1, the threshold 
c
A = 0.122 is in agreement with the
observations in Fig. 6. The lower right panel of Fig. 7 shows the corresponding phase
diagram. There are two phases: The first phase, in which group A has the majority due
to A > B, and the second, where the rivaling group B dominates. In both regions, it is
either the case that the activist dynamics leads to a stable Nash equilibrium or that a limit
cycle behavior with a phase separation described by Eq. (13) emerges. In the supplementary
material, we show that the described behavior is also present in the case of an even number
of states N . The difference is that there already exist four Nash equilibria for A = B,
due to the absence of a unique center. Furthermore, in the supplementary material, we
describe that the non-existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is also observable for
both initially polarized and unpolarized populations.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a mathematical framework to study polarization effects in a one-
dimensional opinion chain. Each state in the chain corresponds to a certain party identi-
fication (e.g., democrat or republican) correlated with certain political views (e.g., liberal
or conservative). Transitions are possible from every state to its neighboring states with a
finite probability. We account for political activists by introducing local biases in the prob-
ability flows according to a given activist influence. Our model describes polarization as a
phenomenon emerging in the presence of competing activists, their mutual positioning in so-
ciety, and the dynamic diffusion of ideas in society. Possible extensions of our work include
the dynamics of more than two activists, multiple opinion chains representing individual
states or subgroups of a society, and activists whose influence will not vanish immediately
after they have left a certain state.
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Figure 8. Intrinsic anti-polarization and polarization effects. Intrinsic anti-polarization
and polarization effects are taken into account according to Eqs. (A2) and (A3). In the left panel,
we set λC = 1.05 and λE = 0, whereas in the right panel, we set λC = 0 and λE = 1.05. Numerical
and analytical results (Eq. (6) in the main text) are represented by grey dots and a black solid
line, respectively. The data has been averaged over 103 samples for p = 0.2 and T = 2 × 106 and
105 initial equilibration steps.
Appendix A: Initially unpolarized and polarized populations
In addition to different persuasion effects of both activists A+ and B+ and accordingly
different values of A and B, it may also be the case that there is an intrinsic imbalance in
the probability flow (i.e., an anti-polarizing or a polarizing force due to gradually different
values of the transition probability p). We model the anti-polarization effect with a transition
probability that decays according to
pi = λCpi−1 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, (A1)
qi−1 = λCqi for i ∈ {9, 8, 7}. (A2)
An example of an anti-polarized stationary opinion distribution for λC = 1.05 is shown in
the left panel of Fig. 8. A value of λC > 1 clearly leads to a larger concentration of voters
at the center. In a similar way, we model a polarizing effect with
pi = λEpi−1 for i ∈ {6, 7, 8},
qi−1 = λEqi, for i ∈ {4, 3, 2}.
(A3)
A value of λE > 1 leads to an initially polarized opinion distribution as shown in the right
panel of Fig. 8.
We also investigate the best responses for the situation where an activist A+ has a larger
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persuasion effect according to A > B. We illustrate the best responses for λC = 1.05 and
λE = 0 in Fig. 9 and for λC = 0 and λE = 1.05 in Fig. 10. The observed behavior is in
agreement with the one found for an initially unpolarized society in the main text. If the
difference between A and B is small enough, a unique Nash equilibrium exists. However,
if the difference becomes too large, no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is observable
anymore. Instead we find the same cycle behavior as in the main text.
Appendix B: Even number of states
In the main part of the manuscript, we described the emergence of dynamic equilibria for
A > 
c
A. However, we only focused on an odd number of states (N = 9). In the case of an
even number states, there exists no unique center. Due to the missing center, there are also
multiple Nash equilibria, as shown in the upper panels of Fig. 11 where we set A = B = 0.1
and N = 12. Interestingly, two equilibria correspond to uniform stationary distributions,
whereas the remaining ones describe a polarized and an unpolarized population. Unlike in
the case of a clearly defined center, we find the possibility of an emerging polarization or
anti-polarization effect for equally strong activists. A slight increase of the value of A leads
to the disappearance of the Nash equilibria. Instead we find a dynamic equilibrium where
activist A+ avoids its opponent and moves to the right first. Increasing the value of A
even more makes activist A+ avoid its opponent by moving to the left. This behavior is in
accordance with the observations made in the main text.
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Figure 9. Best responses for different activist positions and different persuasion
probabilities. Based on Eq. (6) in the main text, the stationary solution is computed for activists
at different locations, which lead to locally larger (q+A, p+B) or smaller (p−A, q−B) transition
probabilities (p = 0.2). From the upper left to the lower right panel, we assumed different values
of A ∈ {0.15, 0.16, 0.17, 0.18, 0.19, 0.199} and set B = 0.1. In addition, we incorporated anti-
polarization effects according to Eq. (A2) and set λC = 1.05 and λE = 0. All states left (right)
from the center are counted as belonging to group A (group B).
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Figure 10. Best responses for different activist positions and different persuasion
probabilities. Based on Eq. (6) in the main text, the stationary solution is computed for activists
at different locations, which lead to locally larger (q+A, p+B) or smaller (p−A, q−B) transition
probabilities (p = 0.2). From the upper left to the lower right panel, we assumed different values
of  ∈ {0.12, 0.13, . . . , 0.19} and set B = 0.1. In addition, we incorporated polarization effects
according to Eq. (A2) and set λC = 0 and λE = 1.05. All states left (right) from the center are
counted as belonging to group A (group B). 20
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Figure 11. Stationary distributions and best responses for an even number of states.
Based on Eq. (6) in the main text, the stationary solution is computed for two activists at different
locations which lead to locally larger (p + A, p + B) or smaller (p − A, p − B) transition
probabilities (p = 0.2). The number of states is N = 12. From the upper to the lower panels,
we assumed different values of A ∈ {0.1, 0.11, 0.15} and set B = 0.1. All states left from state 7
belong to group A, whereas all states right from state 6 belong to group B. The left panels show
the stationary distributions for different locations of activists jA and jB. The right panels are the
corresponding best response curves. There exist four Nash equilibria for A = B and dynamic
equilibria otherwise.
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